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Abstract Using the SemanticDistance Task,we investigated the semantic distances between
ME and five metaphorically conceptualized notions: PAST, FUTURE, JOY, SADNESS, and
HAPPINESS. Three Polish-speaking groups participated in the study: depressive subjects
(n = 30), patients in remission (n = 12), and non-depressed individuals (n = 30). T -test and
the Kruskal–Wallis nonparametric equivalent of ANOVA analyses showed that subjects in
remission placed ME significantly farther away from PAST than non-depressed individuals
and depressed patients. Data mining algorithms indicated the distances ME–SADNESS,
ME–PAST, and ME–FUTURE as the three strongest predictors of group membership. We
interpret the findings in the light of a contrast effect and defense mechanisms. We propose
that intergroup differences are especially prominent in tasks requiring creation of semantic
associative relations, that is, in the first stage of conceptual processing. We suggest treating
the results as confirmation that Beck’s theory of depression applies at the level of notion
comprehension, proving that processing of key concepts in depression symptoms (particularly
PAST) runs differently in all three groups under consideration.
Keywords Depression · Remission · Concepts · Notions · Semantic distance
How Depression Influences Production of Metaphorical
Conceptualizations of Notions
The problem of how patients with depression, and those in remission from depression, under-
stand notions (interpreted in this paper asmental representations of elements of the external or
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(Beck 1963, 1967), a cognitive theory of depression that is among the best-known, and most
often corroborated empirically (cf. Solomon and Haaga 2005), places the main emphasis on
cognitive disorders in thinking. In particular, it describes dysfunctional thinking patterns and
negative automatic thoughts that focus mainly on three areas of experience: the self (me),
the personal future, and the world (the cognitive triad; cf. Beck 1995). The processing of
notions has only a minor presence in Beck’s theory. His content-specificity hypothesis (Beck
1976) states that negative stimuli—including verbal ones—attract the attention of depressed
subjects particularly strongly (for empirical studies, see e.g., Blaut 2003; Fales et al. 2008;
Gollan et al. 2008; Lamberton and Oei 2008; for a review, see e.g., Gotlib and Neubauer
2000).
Meanwhile, there is much evidence to suggest that depression disturbs the mechanism of
notion comprehension, in particular affecting metaphorical processing. Studies on depres-
sive patients provide evidence that several cognitive functions are disrupted as a result of
depression, including those that play a key role in metaphorical processing. They are mainly
executive and attentional functions and working memory.
Poorer executive functions, and especially executive control deficits, are one of the most
often replicated results on the cognitive functioning of depressed subjects (Holmes and Piz-
zagalli 2007; Joorman et al. 2006; see also Dichter et al. 2009: fMRI evidence for problems
with cognitive control). Problems with executive functions in depression manifest them-
selves mainly in tasks requiring monitoring of execution and flexible changes of behavior
(e.g., Siegle et al. 2004). One of the key causes of disruption in processes requiring control
and concentration in depression are changes in patients’ attentional functioning (e.g., Kemp
et al. 2009; Mahurin et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2006; for a review, see Georgieff et al. 1998).
Some explanations refer to the classical theory that accounts for the contribution of affective
states to the distribution of attentional resources (Ellis and Ashbrook 1988; for a review, see
e.g., Olofsson et al. 2008). Others invoke the fact that people with depression dedicate a lot of
their cognitive resources to processing information related tomistakes (or information related
to depressive mood, see e.g., Stordal et al. 2004; or—more generally—information irrele-
vant to the task in hand, see e.g., Hecker and Meiser 2005), which reduces their capacity for
effective cognitive functioning. Another key area of cognitive functioning that is disrupted by
depression is memory (for a review, see e.g., Ellwart et al. 2003). In particular, many studies
(e.g. Fossati et al. 1999; Hecker and Se˛dek 1999; but see also Harvey et al. 2005) suggest
that depressed subjects have deficits of working memory (in the sense of Engle’s model;
Engle et al. 1999; which is an interesting attempt to merge attention and memory theory, and
emphasizing individual differences in working memory). One possible explanation is that
a person’s negative mood in itself engages the cognitive resources too much, inclining the
individual to remember and process information that is compatible with that mood (Dalgleish
et al. 2007; Stordal et al. 2004; for a review, see Piotrowski and Wierzchon´ 2009) though not
necessarily relevant to the cognitive task at hand (cf. also studies on depressive ruminations;
e.g., Joormann and Gotlib 2008; Levens et al. 2009). Recently it has often been emphasized
that cognitive deficits in depressive subjects are revealed especially during effortful, elab-
orative processing, but not when automatic and pre-attentional processes are involved (cf.
the “integrated theory,” Williams et al. 2007; reviewed in Ellwart et al. 2003; cf. also the
cognitive exhaustion model, Se˛dek et al. 2010; for empirical support, see e.g., Ellwart et al.
2003; Se˛dek and Hecker 2004).
Results of research on how depression-induced cognitive changes subside during remis-
sion are inconsistent. Earlier publications suggest that they recede with the remission of
depression symptoms (e.g., Barnett and Gotlib, 1988, as cited in Ilardi and Craighead 1999).
But more recent research indicates that even people cured of depression present a special
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pattern of information processing (Atchley et al. 2007; Biringer et al. 2005; Holmes and Piz-
zagalli 2007; Neu et al. 2005). Recently, it has even been suggested that the root of cognitive
vulnerability to depression could be genetic predisposition, and that this negative bias may
already manifest itself in early childhood (Hayden et al. 2008). Ruminations (i.e., automatic,
uncontrolled negative thoughts about oneself, the world, and the future) are suggested to
be one possible mechanism of this influence (Joormann and Gotlib 2008). Ruminations are
often associated with depressive individuals’ problems with attention, and with controlling
working memory content (Joormann and Gotlib 2008; cf. also Levens et al. 2009), and are
considered a factor in susceptibility to depression and in recurrence of depressive episodes
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema and Larson, 1999, as cited in Joormann and
Gotlib 2008).
Cognitive functions that are disturbed as a result of depression also play a major role
in the production and comprehension of metaphors (in particular, working memory; e.g.,
Chiappe and Chiappe 2007; Monetta and Pell 2007; and supression processes, e.g., Gerns-
bacher et al. 2001). Furthermore, there is considerable research (e.g., reviewed in Talarowska
et al. 2011) pointing to the existence of close neurobiological links between mood, atten-
tion, and figurative language processing (in particular, the role of the right hemisphere).
An especially important role in metaphorical processing appears to be played by working
memory. This is confirmed by theoretical models, e.g., Kintsch’s (2000, 2001) predication
model (reviewed, e.g., in Chiappe and Chiappe 2007) or Glucksberg’s class-inclusion model
(Glucksberg 2001, 2003; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990). The Kintsch model implies that
people with working memory deficits (a) can have insufficient resources to activate an ade-
quately developed semantic network, and (b) are less able to suppress the distinctive, but
irrelevant, features of the predicate, due to which they usually take longer to provide an
interpretation of a metaphorical statement, and their interpretations are of poorer quality
(cf. also Blasko 1999; Gernsbacher et al. 2001). Glucksberg’s model assumes a substantial
role of working memory mechanisms and executive functions (especially control and sup-
pression) in the correct interpretation of metaphorical statements. According to Glucksberg,
interpreting a metaphor (e.g., Cigarettes are a time bomb) requires one to create an ad hoc
context-appropriate higher category. Those features of the metaphor carrier that are key to
the metaphor’s meaning are highlighted (e.g., health and life hazard), while those that apply
to its basic category, but are unimportant for the metaphor’s meaning (e.g., a tool of terrorist
activity), are suppressed. The role of these mechanisms (also known as priming and sup-
pression effects), especially suppression, have been confirmed by research, including that of
Gernsbacher and associates from 2001. The importance of working memory in metaphorical
processing has been confirmed by many empirical studies (e.g., Chiappe and Chiappe 2007;
Monetta and Pell 2007).
Results of Earlier Research on Metaphor Processing by Depressive
Subjects
The similarity between cognitive functions that are disturbed as a result of depression, and
those that are significant from the point of view of metaphorical processing, prompted us to
conclude (see Bartczak and Bokus 2015) that depression could be correlated with changes in
cognitive representations of notions; in particular that (a) depressive subjects would produce
fewer metaphors of a given notion than healthy subjects, and that (b) compared to the cog-
nitive representations of notions produced by healthy subjects, the cognitive representations
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of neutral and positive notions produced by depressive subjects would have more negative
valence, while the cognitive representations of negative notions - more positive valence. (We
understood notions as mental representations of elements of the external or inner reality.
In our study, notions are not beliefs but mental representations of the signified elements of
linguistic signs. Thus, notions are “concepts in use.”) We also assumed that a depressive
pattern of cognitive representation would be observable during remission of the disorder. We
adopted concepts that are of key importance from the point of view of depression itself and
its symptoms (PAST, FUTURE, JOY, SADNESS, and HAPPINESS1). Three adult Polish-
speaking groups participated in the study: patients suffering from depression, those currently
in remission from depression, and non-depressed individuals. The task (the Questionnaire
of the Metaphorical Conceptualization of a Notion, QMCN; for a detailed description, see
Bartczak and Bokus 2015) was to read sentences about PAST, FUTURE, JOY, SADNESS,
and HAPPINESS and to assess how accurately they described the notions. Each sentence
had previously been judged by competent raters relative to valence, metaphoricity, and con-
ventionalization. (For specimen sentences and detailed information about participants, data
analysis, and results, see Bartczak and Bokus 2015).
Contrary to our predictions, the results did not confirm that depressive subjects have
problems with processing metaphorical content. We interpret this as supporting:
1. Theories that posit the automatic, unconscious, and effortless character of metaphorical
content processing;
2. Votes claiming that the process of producing and understandingmetaphors occurs as auto-
matically and rapidly as with literal statements (e.g., Gernsbacher et al. 2001; Glucksberg
2003);
3. Neuropsychological theories of metaphor (e.g., Schnitzer and Pedreira 2005) assuming
that metaphorical thinking is natural for humans, and results from the way the brain is
organized and operates;
4. Models predicting that depressive cognitive deficits emerge only in processing that
requires effort, and not in automatic and unconscious processes (cf. Williams’ integrated
theory, Williams, 1988, 1997, cited in Ellwart et al. 2003; cf. also the theory of Se¸dek
invoking the cognitive exhaustion model, for a review, see Se˛dek et al. 2010).
On the other hand, the valence prediction has found strong confirmation in the results.
We see this as evidence that the negative cognitive patterns posited by Beck (1963, 1967)
also manifest themselves at the level of notions comprehension. One possible explanation
for a negative interpretation bias in depressive subjects is the influence that ruminations have
on cognitive processes. Ruminations are activated, among other things, by a negative mood,
and last for a long time due to factors such as depressive subjects’ deficits in refreshing
their working memory (Joormann and Gotlib 2008). It is possible that the high activity of
negative representations, and problems with replacing them with positive ones leading to
mood improvement, is conducive to negative processing of new stimuli, including verbal
ones (for results concerning nonverbal stimuli, see e.g., Gollan et al. 2008).
1 In many sources studying depression symptoms, these particular terms are used for describing cognitive
distortions and affective disorders in depressed patients. Among other things, it is believed that depressive
subjects perceive their past chiefly as a source of failure and paint their future in dark colors, that the dominating
mental state of depressed patients is sadness, and that patients are unable to feel joy or to be happy (e.g.,
Rosenhan et al. 2003, p. 272; cf. also descriptions of depressive symptoms in ICD-10, Puz˙yn´ski and Wciórka
1997; and in DSM-5). The same notions are also used to characterize symptoms of depression in theoretical
models of depressive disorders, e.g. Beck’s (1963, 1967) cognitive theory of depression, or Clark andWatson’s
(1991) tripartite model of anxiety and depression.
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Contrary to our expectations (and the results of other studies, e.g., Atchley et al. 2007;
Holmes and Pizzagalli 2007;Watkins et al. 2000), the prediction as to the “depressive” model
of replies given by subjects in remission from depressionwas not confirmed by the results. An
analysis of the results for three groups showed that all the statistically significant correlations
observed between the results of the depressed group and the group in remission were also
found between the depressed group and the healthy group. This is all the more interesting
is that subjects in remission from depression gave almost the same replies as subjects from
the control group, and significantly different ones from those of patients suffering from
depression. The first interpretation that springs to mind is that cognitive changes during
remission simply subside (for a similar claim, see e.g., Barnett and Gotlib, 1988, cited in
Ilardi and Craighead 1999). Interestingly, however, when we took valence into account, the
replies of subjects in remission in several cases were even more “non-depressive” (had more
positive valence) than the replies of healthy subjects. The question arises: Does a depressive
episode in the past act like a vaccine, “retuning” conceptual mechanisms in a non-depressive
direction (e.g., by activating positively marked semantic networks)? Or is this result, perhaps,
the effect of defense mechanisms that replace negative representations with positive ones
(cf. the case of PAST) and thus enable individuals to function effectively? The proposed
interpretation does not dispel all doubts, e.g., how do we explain the tendency, observed in
some patients with a depressive episode in their case history, for recurrences of depression in
the future? Of course we cannot preclude another interpretation, i.e., that cognitive changes
caused by depression continue (though less intensively) in remission from depression, but
are not apparent in tasks requiring metaphorical sentence processing.
Studying the Relational Network Between Notions as a Key to Solve the
Inconsistency of Results Concerning Performance of Subjects in
Remission From Depression
The results obtained in the studies involving the QMCN strongly suggested that we should
reject the hypothesis that people in remission from depression perform similarly in linguistic
tasks as depressed patients. However, results of our other studies (see e.g. Bartczak andBokus
2013; Bartczak et al. 2010) revealed a puzzling effect and inclined us not to reject the hypothe-
sis. The same three groups of subjects (depressed patients, those in remission fromdepression,
and non-depressed individuals) were asked to produce seven free associations for each of the
fivenotions in the study, and for 10 randomly chosenwords from theKent andRosanoff (1910)
list. The associations provided by the subjects were then analyzed in terms of valence. Words
with unequivocally positive evaluative connotations (e.g. past–wonderful, sadness–friend)
were considered to have positive valence. Negative valence was assigned to associations with
unquestionably negative evaluative connotations (e.g. sadness–tears, joy–pointless). Lack of
evaluation (neutral valence) was assigned to itemswhosemain functionwas designative (e.g.,
past–calendar) and to words whose axiological charge can be different for different users of
language and dependent on their individual experience (cf. future–job, past–pregnancy).
The results in this case—similarly to the QMCN results—confirmed the hypothesis on the
more intensive negative processing of neutral and positive notions (PAST, FUTURE, JOY,
HAPPINESS) in the depressive group relative to healthy subjects. Analysis of the replies in
the association task furnished one more interesting result not found in studies using other
tools: a significant difference in the replies of the two non-depressive groups, that is, non-
depressed individuals and those in remission from depression. These two groups differed
significantly in terms of the valence of associations for PAST, and in terms of both the
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number of negative associations and the number of neutral and positive ones. Compared
to the control group, subjects who had suffered a depressive episode in the past produced
significantly more positive associations for PAST, and fewer neutral and negative ones. The
high statistical significance of these differences (see Bartczak and Bokus 2013; Bartczak
et al. 2010) makes them an extremely interesting problem for interpretation, especially since
the result runs contrary to expectations.
The result obtained in the association task, especially after juxtaposition with the QMCN
results, that did not reveal any significant differences in the two non-depressive groups’
replies, prompted us to conduct a further search. We believe that one of the possible explana-
tions for the aforementioned discrepancy is that differences in conceptual processing between
the group in remission and the control group occur especially at the first, earliest stage of
conceptual processing (as understood in the LASS theory presented by Simmons et al. 2008).
The LASS (Language and Situated Simulation) theory treats the formation of verbal asso-
ciations as an important stage in the conceptual process, and associations themselves as a
measure of the meaning of a given lexical unit or an indicator of the semantic relations in
a given semantic field. According to this theory, the creation of associations is an essential
condition for understanding notions. The LASS theory assumes that the process of under-
standing notions involves two intrinsicmechanisms: (a) activation in the language system and
(b) situated simulation. Activation in the language system is faster: In response to a verbal
stimulus, and the activation of other linguistic forms, mainly verbal associations, occur first.
It is only after a given word (e.g., the word dog) is identified via the language system and
associations are activated (e.g., cat, barking, bone, meat) that the brain starts to reproduce
perceptual, motor, and mental states that are activated during interaction with the word’s
referents (e.g., activation of the neuronal connections representing the look of a specific dog,
contact with it, emotions it triggers). The LASS theory has been confirmed by fMRI results
showing that the first stage of conceptual processing involves the activation of similar areas
of the brain that are responsible for performance in the verbal association test (especially the
Broca area; cf. Simmons et al. 2008).
Problem: Research Question and Hypotheses
Since, according to the LASS theory, the first stage in understanding notions involves cre-
ating associative semantic networks, and since in our earlier studies differences appeared
between the group in remission from depression and non-depressed individuals at this stage
of processing of notions, we decided to investigate what semantic relations the subjects would
create between the analyzed notions. Taking into account the character of depressive cogni-
tive distortions posited by Beck’s cognitive theory of depression (1963, 1967), our focus of
interest was the relation between the notions in the study and the notion of ME. Our research
question was:
Do healthy subjects, depressive patients, and those in remission from depression differ
in how they build semantic distances between the notions of ME and FUTURE, PAST,
JOY, HAPPINESS, and SADNESS?
To keep consistency with the first part of our project (Bartczak and Bokus 2015), we
wanted the notions under investigation to be conceptualized metaphorically: The participants
were asked to treat them as guests coming to a party and to seat them at a round table (for
details, see “Materials: The Semantic Distance Task” subsection). Our tool, the Semantic
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Distance Task (SDT, see below), enabled us to describe the relations between the notions as
semantic distances and to express them numerically. Based on results of earlier studies (e.g.,
Bartczak and Bokus 2015), and on the claims of Beck’s (1963, 1967) cognitive theory of
depression, we assumed that (a) compared to healthy people, depressive subjects would build
greater semantic distances betweenME and the notions of FUTURE, JOY, HAPPINESS, and
smaller ones betweenME and SADNESS, and (b) that the replies of people in remission from
depression would be significantly different from those of depressive and healthy subjects in
terms of the semantic distances built between the notions of ME and PAST. Considering the
surprising result of the association task regarding the positive valence of associations for
PAST produced by people in remission from depression, which we interpreted as an effect
of defense mechanisms, we assumed PAST could be moved away from ME in the replies of
those who had suffered a depressive episode in the past.
Methods
Participants
Three adult Polish-speaking groups participated in the study, the same subjects who had com-
pleted theQMCNand the association task. The first group (experimental group, E) comprised
30 subjects suffering from depression: patients of psychiatric wards and outpatient depart-
ments atWarsawhospitalswhowere diagnosedwith F32.1 andF33.1 according to the ICD-10
classification (Puz˙yn´ski and Wciórka 1997; F32.1—moderate depressive episode, F33.1—
recurring depression disorder, currently moderate depressive episode; cf. major depression
disorder in DSM-IV; American 1994). The second group (control group, C) comprised 30
subjects who had never had depression: medical and non-medical staff from the hospitals
where the study was carried out. The third group (remission group, R) comprised patients of
hospital outpatient departmentswith a depressive episode behind them, currently in remission
(with a diagnosis of F33.4 or F32 in the examination according to ICD-10; F32.1—moderate
depressive episode, F33.1—recurring depression disorder, currently moderate depressive
episode). The third group was the smallest one, with only 12 subjects. In the 6 months of the
study it proved impossible to reach a larger number fulfilling the assumed criteria for being
placed in group R.
Theparticipants for groupsE andRwere chosen in cooperationwith four psychiatrists. The
doctors selected patients with the relevant diagnoses and then asked for their consent to take
part in a study on notions. All participants gave their informed verbal consent prior to partic-
ipation. Subjects were assigned to a given group based on their medical diagnosis following
an in-depth interview, taking into account their result in the Beck Depression Inventory2
(BDI; Beck 1973; Beck and Beamesderfer 1974; Beck et al. 1987; cf. also Parnowski and
Jenajczyk 1977). As in other studies on depressive subjects, an individual was considered to
suffer from depression if his or her result was equal to or higher than 10 (Beck et al. 1987;
Ruscio and Ruscio 2002; see also Fajkowska and Marszał-Wis´niewska 2006). Group E had
an average BDI value of 25.95 (range 18–48), strongly distinguishing it from the other two
groups. The average BDI values in groups C and R were similar: BDI = 5.0 (range 0–9) and
BDI = 5.25 (range 1–9), respectively. From among the patients with depression, seven had
not suffered from depression before and 23 declared that this was their second episode.2
2 The Polish translation of the BDI was used; when we were conducting our research, research on the Polish
adaptation of the BDI-II was being conducted elsewhere (see e.g., Zawadzki et al. 2009).
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The groups were balanced for age (E : Mage = 44.3, range 21–77, SD = 14.22; C :
Mage = 44.6, range 23–83, SD = 17.88; R : Mage = 49.1, range 23–78, SD = 17.82) and
sex (24 females and six males in Groups E and C, and nine females and three males in group
R); education, place of residence, and income per capita in the subjects’ households was also
controlled.
Materials: The Semantic Distance Task (SDT)
The SDThas not been used in earlier research projects. Its structure, based on assigning places
to notions at a round table, enables the SDT to be considered a special version of the semantic
distance latency test used in research on cognitive representations of different categories and
notions. For example, Chiao et al. (2004) used the semantic distance technique to study
representations of social status. In the “status condition”, the subjects compared the names of
university occupations and ranks in the Navywith a selected anchor noun (assistant professor
and captain, respectively), decidingwhether a givenwordwas of higher, lower, or of the same
status compared to the anchor. In the “number condition”, there were numbers—from 33 to
99—instead of position names (the anchor was the number 65). Based on analyses of reaction
times, the authors concluded that the subjects represented the names of professional ranks
in the same way as distances between different numbers (comparing two positions/numbers
that were far apart was faster than comparing stimuli similar to each other). The results of
this study on understanding social status suggest that, in some respects, representations of
semantic distance are comparable to representations of distances between numbers.
We modified the version of the task used by Chiao et al. (2004) because we wanted the
notions to be understood metaphorically. Similarly to the task used by Chiao et al., the SDT
was conceived in such a way that the distances between the different notions could be coded
as numerical values. Our modification was that the subjects were asked to imagine that they
were invited to a party attended by guests with the following nicknames: Past, Future, Joy,
Sadness, and Happiness. The task of the subjects was (a) to briefly characterize each guest
by listing their relevant qualities, (b) to propose two extra guests of their choice who could
be invited to the party and to briefly characterize them, and (c) to seat all the guests and
themselves (“me”) at a round table (the Semantic Distance Task, along with instructions for
participants, can be found in “Appendix”).
Data Analysis
Based on the way the “guests” were seated at the table, numerical values were assigned to the
distances between the different notions. This was done as follows: The distance represented
by guests X and Y, seated next to each other, was given a value of 1. If guests X and Y were
separated by one “person”, the value was 2; by two “people”, it was 3; and when there were
three “people” in between, it equaled 4. The values assigned to the different distances are
shown in Fig. 1.
Independent-measures t tests were used to examine the existence of significant inter-
group differences in the distances between the analyzed notions and ME (for details, see
the “Results” section), and an analysis using the data mining technique (with the help of
the STATISTICA Data Miner 8 software) was performed. Data mining, based on artificial
intelligence elements (Nisbet et al. 2009), usesmathematical algorithms to obtain information
concealed in the data and uncover its structure, and can be perceived as themethod of decision-
making. The program builds models illustrating the structure of the data and estimates the
error rate of each model (the lower the error rate, the greater the model’s predictive power).
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Fig. 1 Assigning numerical
values to the distances between
notions, based on the results of
the Semantic Distance Task
To form a model out of a set of analyzed variables, a variable whose values are to be modeled
is chosen (i.e., the target variable). This variable is explained by other categories of variables
(predictors) indicated by the researcher. The aim of the analyses is to generate a mathematical
function that enables the sample to be split into subgroups that are homogeneous with regard
to the target variable.
There is hitherto only very limited psychological literature on data exploration using the
data mining approach so far (cf. discussion in Yim et al. 2014). Papers by Chang (2007);
Faulkner et al. (2010); Szymanska (2012); and Yim et al. (2014) can serve as examples.
In our research, the C&RT (Classification and Regression Tree) mathematical algorithm
was used. As Szymanska (2012) describes, “the algorithm builds a decision tree graph which
represents the input of the predictors in explaining the target variable.…TheC&RT algorithm
uses the predictors and performs the function so as to maximize the homogeneity of the
groups…. The C&RT algorithm also arranges the predictors according to their importance in
explaining the dependent variable (target variable) but at the same time it provides the splitting
points. Such a structure of the decision tree enables the reconstruction of the differentiation,
which is extremely useful when interpreting the results” (pp. 220–221).
In our model, the target variable is the nominal variable: E, C, and R, while the input
variable—the distances between ME and the other notions (ME–PAST, ME–FUTURE, etc.,
a continuous variable).
Procedure
All procedures were carried out according to the Declaration of Helsinki and were approved
by the ethical committee of the University of Warsaw’s Faculty of Psychology. Participants
were tested individually. The subjects were asked for their consent to take part in a research
project on the understanding of notions.Upon consenting theywere given sheetswith the tools
and instructions and a token of appreciation in the formof a penwith theUniversity ofWarsaw
logo. Due to the increased fatigue of depressive patients, the instructions stated that the study
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Table 1 Results of the Semantic Distance Task for group E (experimental), C (control), and R (remission
from depression)
PAST FUTURE JOY SADNESS HAPPINESS PERSON 1 PERSON 2
ME
E: 2.00 (1.31)∗∗ 2.40 (1.16) 2.07 (1.17) 2.30 (1.39) 2.17 (1.21) 1.47 (1.04) 1.53 (1.01)
C: 2.27 (1.11)∗ 2.73 (1.23) 2.07 (1.01) 2.80 (0.97) 1.93 (1.20) 1.50 (0.94) 1.60 (0.89)
R: 3.25 (1.21) 2.17 (1.11) 2.03 (1.16) 2.25 (1.05) 1.58 (0.79) 1.58 (1.00) 1.67 (1.07)
The data are mean distances between concepts. Standard deviations in parentheses
C never-depressed individuals, E patients suffering from depression, R participants currently in remission,
with a depressive episode behind them
∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01
could be interrupted if the subject felt tired, and would be continued later. The subjects filled
out the questionnaire at home and brought it to their next doctor’s appointment. The directors
of the units where the study was conducted agreed to patient and staff participation in the
project. The selection of depressive patients for the study was made in cooperation with the
psychiatrists treating them; participation in the study did not disrupt therapy in any way.
We were assured by the doctors that the patients selected for the study met our selection
criteria (in particular, excluding any comorbid diagnosis potentially influencing patients’
performance).
Results
The structure of the tool enables the distances between notions to be presented in the form
of numerical values. The average distances for the different notions, together with standard
deviations, are shown in Table 1.
Looking at the results, one can see that, as expected, group E situated SADNESS a little
closer toME than group C, but in the case of both groups there were no noticeable differences
of distances between ME and JOY, and between ME and HAPPINESS. However, the most
interesting observations were provided by the group in remission from depression. Interest-
ingly, in a few cases they were different from the results of both group E and C, especially
as regards the temporal notions. For example, compared to the other two groups, subjects
with a depressive episode behind them placed PAST farther away from ME (agreeing with
our predictions), and FUTURE farther away from SADNESS, but also from HAPPINESS.
We analyzed the significance of inter-group differences in the distances between the ana-
lyzed notions and ME. The t Student test confirmed a significant divergence between the
results of groups R, C, and E in the distance between ME and PAST. In fact, subjects in
remission placed ME significantly farther away from PAST (M = 3.25, SD = 1.21) than
subjects from the control group, M = 2.27, SD = 1.11, t (40) = −2.52, p = .016 (multiple
comparison test LSD p = .021; Bonferroni adjusted p = .06). The effect size was large
(Cohen’s d = −0.80). A similar difference was observed between the results of groups R
and E; R: M = 3.25, SD = 1.21; E: M = 2.00, SD = 1.31, t (40) = −2.84, p = .007
(Bonferroni adjusted p = .01, multiple comparison test LSD p = .004). The effect size was
large (Cohen’s d = −0.90). The differences between groups E and C regarding the distance
to PAST, and between groups E and C, E and R, and C and R regarding the distance between
ME and the other notions, were not statistically significant. The results are also confirmed
by the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric equivalent of ANOVA, χ2(2) = 9.163, p = .010.
123
J Psycholinguist Res (2017) 46:345–366 355
Fig. 2 Decision tree presenting the predictors of belonging to group E (experimental), C (control), and R
(remission from depression) on the basis of the ME-SADNESS, ME-PAST, and ME-FUTURE distances
In the next step, we conducted an analysis using the datamining technique, with the help of
the STATISTICA Data Miner 8 software. On a 20-% sample of results (n = 14) the program
found the technique that was best for analyzing the given structure of the data: the Classifica-
tion and Regression Trees method (C&RT; cf. Berg 2008; Nisbet et al. 2009). This technique
(its structure being that of a decision tree) had the smallest error rate (14.29%) compared to
all other techniques (including Quinlan’s algorithm, Automated Neural Networks, Boosted
Trees, Support Vector Machines MARSplines; see Nisbet et al. 2009), and the accuracy of
the C&RT model was 85.71%. This means that, based on the set predictors, the model could
predict, with an accuracy of 85.71%, which group (E, C, or R) a person with a given result
in the SDT was from. As the three strongest predictors of group membership the program
indicated the distances ME-SADNESS, ME-PAST, and ME-FUTURE. They were then used
to analyze the remaining data set (n = 58).
The decision tree showing the predictors of the subjects’ membership in a given group
is presented in Fig. 2. It turned out that the limit point dividing the sample into maximally
homogeneous groups was the distance between SADNESS and ME. An average distance of
over 2.82 was a predictor of a person’s belonging to the group of subjects in remission from
depression, and a value lower than (or equal to) 2.82—as belonging to the depressed patient
group (distance of 2.32–2.82) or to the control group (distance smaller than 2.32 or equal to
2.32). The other limit points were the distance between PAST and ME (if greater than 3.5,
then group R; if smaller than or equal to 3.5, then group C) and between ME and FUTURE
(if greater than 2.5, then group C or R; if smaller, then group C).
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Discussion
Interpreting the Results
The Semantic Distance Test used in our research belongs to the group of projective tech-
niques. It is based on a different procedure of concluding about an individual’s qualities
than questionnaires, in which we ask about conscious behaviors, experiences, and beliefs
(Piotrowski et al. 1993). Here, we invoke content from outside the individual’s awareness.
There are no “right” or “wrong” responses. The aim is to maximize the chances of individ-
uals revealing themselves (spontaneously, without the limitations of conscious decisions).
The study involves a projection manifested in the way individuals perceive and organize the
stimulatorymaterial (a party at a round table) in terms of their own expectations, needs, goals,
etc. The distance between metaphorically conceptualized notions and ME, measured by the
way the guests (notions) are seated at the round table, turned out to be a device providing
information on the structure of semantic networks, of which the relations between ME and
PAST, FUTURE, JOY, SADNESS, and HAPPINESS are an important part.
Due to the specificity of depression symptoms, subjects without symptoms of depres-
sion were expected to place the name of a negative emotion (SADNESS) farther away from
ME, and the names of positive emotions (JOY, HAPPINESS)—closer to ME than depressive
subjects. The analysis results confirmed this prediction as regards SADNESS. Dividing the
sample intomaximally homogenous groups, the C&RT algorithms predicted that participants
suffering from depression would assign a value smaller than 2.82 to the ME-SADNESS rela-
tion rather than greater than 2.82. This result is not surprising, considering that an intensified
feeling of sadness is a typical symptom of depression (see e.g., Rosenhan et al. 2003, p. 272;
cf. also Beck 1963, 1967, 1976; for neuroimaging evidence of a negativity bias in depression,
see Fales et al. 2008).
Our second prediction regarding the SDT results was that the replies of those in remission
from depression would differ significantly from the replies of depressive and healthy subjects
in terms of the semantic distances built between the notions of ME and PAST. We based this
supposition on the interpretation of the association task results. In the test, group R had
produced more positive associations than the control group, which we interpreted as being
the effect of defense mechanisms. It was interesting to observe that – true to our prediction—
the greatest distances were assigned to this relation by the group of subjects in remission from
depression, not by the control group. We obtained such results in both the t test analysis and
the data mining analysis. This result, showing a significant difference between the remission
group and the control group, is a unique fact for our project concerning understanding of
notions in depression as a whole (Bartczak and Bokus 2013). Apart from the results of the
association test for PAST, the results of the two non-depressive groups (C and R)were usually
very similar and significantly different from the results of the experimental group. Thismakes
it all the more interesting to see the significant difference in the ME-PAST distance.
One possible explanation is that the greater ME-PAST distances observed in the remitted
group are the result of some kind of contrast effect or positive proactive responsemechanisms.
Subjects in remission, having one ormore episodes of depression in the past, see the difference
between their past (depressive) and present (non-depressive) functioning and highlight the
dissimilarities between these two stages.
Another interpretation—as mentioned earlier—suggests that greater distances between
ME and PAST built by subjects in remission are caused by defense mechanisms. Defense
mechanisms, a notion originally referring to Freud’s (1926) theory, are unconscious psycho-
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logical processes that are activated in threatening and anxiety-provoking situations (Cooper
1998; cf. Hamidi and Motlagh 2010). We speculate that a depressive episode from the past
can be interpreted as a threat for the psychological and affective balance of an individual. If
so, it may be that participants from the remitted group situate PAST farther away from ME,
applying one of the basic psychological defense mechanisms: denial. A remitted individual
may pretend that the threatening or anxiety-provoking situation did not happen at all. Denial
is connected with overcoming depression, for example, in the well-known bioenergetic the-
ory of depressive disorders by Lowen (1976). This theory is based on the assumption that all
defense behaviors in depression are motivated by denied negative experiences from the past.
The greatestME-PASTdistance in the remitted groupmay also be interpreted in the light of
rationalization, in particular, of the sweet lemon defense mechanism. Remitted participants
may seemingly rationally explain past depressive attitudes as situationally explained and
adaptive for actual good functioning. Having a depressive episode in the past may be treated
as a valuable experience confronting an individual with his or her emotions, serving as a
catharsis and enabling subsequent non-depressive functioning. Remitted patients may also
make themselves believe that upsetting past experiences and situationswere actually pleasant.
The results obtained can also be explained with reference to the reaction formation defense
mechanism that is based on creating and demonstrating attitudes and behaviors opposite to
those compatible with a person’s real but consciously denied feelings.
Such interpretations are consistent with the literature on the role of defensemechanisms in
the somatic andmental functioning of an individual. For example, Salimynezhad et al. (2015)
provided evidence for a positive correlation between defense mechanisms and general health
and emotional intelligence. Kashani et al. (2014) studied the role of defense mechanisms in
predicting post-traumatic growth in cancer survivors. Hamidi and Motlagh (2010) analyzed
defense mechanisms in patients with obsessive compulsive disorder and found that they use
them more frequently than healthy individuals to reduce anxiety.
Importantly, there is also much evidence that defense mechanisms accompany emotional
problems: depression and anxiety (Blaya et al. 2006; Perry 1988). For instance, Corruble et al.
(2004) studied defense styles in depressed suicide attempters and hypothesized that defense
mechanisms may discriminate between depressed patients with or without recent suicide
attempts. They found that especially humor and sublimation were negatively correlated to
depression intensity (cf. also Mullen et al. 1999). Stepanchuk et al. (2013), interested in
coping strategies anddefensemechanisms in patientswith anoncological diagnosis of chronic
hematological disease (often associated with depressive symptoms and anxiety), found that
the interaction of coping strategies with the defense mechanisms of escape/avoidance and
denial favors adaptive behavior.
Summing up, defense mechanisms may soften anxiety, frustration, and feelings of guilt
evoked by past depression, enhancing non-depressive functioning of an individual. As
asserted by Cramer (1998), the neurotic defense mechanisms (e.g., rationalization and reac-
tion formation) are usually adapted to protect a subject from experiencing unacceptable
thoughts or feelings. Defense mechanisms can aid individuals’ therapy of depressive dis-
orders, helping the patients to face psychological and affective changes (Bond and Perry
2004). This explanation is cohesive with the interpretation of the other significant difference
between groups R and C found in our study. In the association task (for a detailed description
of the results, see Bartczak and Bokus 2013; Bartczak et al. 2010), subjects in remission from
depression produced associations with PAST with a higher valence than the control group.
This result was also discussed, among other considerations, in terms of defense mechanisms
serving to assimilate a depressive episode from the past.
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Another relation that distinguished the three groups was the ME-SADNESS relation. In
accordance with our prediction, patients suffering from depression and remitted individuals
assigned smaller semantic distances to this relation than never-depressed participants. The
result concerning depressive people comes as no surprise and is compatible with clinical and
theoretical descriptions of depression symptoms. The results of the remitted group are in
agreement with our hypothesis that negative bias in understanding notions would be observ-
able during remission of the disorder. We propose to treat this result as confirmation of the
prediction that intergroup differences would be apparent, in particular, in the first, associative
stage of understanding notions (cf. the LASS theory). This would also explain the unexpected
results of the first part of our study (Bartczak and Bokus 2015) where the performance of the
remitted group was just like that of never-depressed individuals. The interpretation of this
fact might be that in the first part of the study, the problem under investigation was process-
ing of metaphorical sentences, while in the SDT, we concentrated on an earlier, more basic
stage of conceptual processing: creating associations and networks between metaphorically
conceptualized notions.
The Semantic Distance Test can also be considered (Waz˙yn´ska et al. 2015) as a way of
measuring the distance between different I-positions (different points of view available to a
person) according to the concept of the dialogical self of Hermans (1999). Each potential I-
position constitutes a separate perspective for the perception and interpretation of experience
(Hermans 2002). The agentive self canmove between the different I-positions, here: positions
occupied by personified metaphorical notions—guests at a round table. These positions,
having not only a certain vision of the world but also a voice (as they do in Bakhtin 1984), are
potential participants in internal dialogues. The agentive self can choose specific interlocutors
more often or less so, it can conduct a cooperative dialogue with guests sitting nearer or a
confrontational one with guests sitting farther away at the round table. The level of tension
within the dialogical self can be of varying degree. Sometimes the affective state, the cognitive
perspective of a given I-position creates tension and is pushed away by the agentive self which
even resorts to defense mechanisms. Our research seems to suggest differences within the
dialogical self in patients with depression and those in remission from depression.
Conclusions
In summary, SDT has emerged as a tool that differentiates the replies of all three groups in
the study. Based on the results, we can offer the following conclusions:
1. A negativity bias in depression also occurs at the level of understanding notions. Our
results show that depression-related cognitive changes described by cognitive theories
of depression, including Beck’s (1963, 1967) theory of depression, occur not only at
the level of thinking, and are not related exclusively to the creation of dysfunctional
thinking patterns, but are also observed at the notion comprehension level, especially for
notions that are key from the point of view of depression symptoms (PAST, FUTURE,
and SADNESS).
2. The first stage of understanding notions, connected with the formation of semantic asso-
ciative networks (cf. the LASS theory; Simmons et al. 2008), seems especially interesting
as a research problem. It is only in tasks requiring the creation of semantic associative
relations that statistically significant differences were observed between the replies of
all three groups in the study: not only the group of depressed subjects and the group of
non-depressed individuals, but also the group in remission from depression.
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3. PAST (and perhaps also SADNESS) seems to be a particularly important notion from
the point of view of studying conceptual processing in depressive subjects and those
in remission from depression. The results obtained in tasks requiring processing of this
notion significantly differentiated the performance of these groups. At the same time,
they could suggest that the depressive cognitive triad (ME-FUTURE-WORLD) should
perhaps be supplemented with this notion as another area in which patients currently
suffering from depression, and those who suffered from it in the past, concentrate their
thoughts.
Limitations of Results and Goals for Further Research
The main limitations of the present results are the medications taken by members of the
experimental group, the lack of any assessment of the participants’ verbal intelligence, and
the specificity of the selection of subjects for the depression remission group.
Themembers of the experimental groupwere chosen from among patients of hospital psy-
chiatric wards and outpatient departments. For obvious reasons, it would have been unethical
to have them stop using their medication during the study. One needs to remember that
the people suffering from depression were taking antidepressants at the time. These drugs
relieve the symptoms of depression, and there is also evidence of their positive impact on
cognitive processes (for a review, see Talarowska et al. 2009). Therefore, one can accept with
a high level of probability that the medication could have affected the depressive patients’
performance of the tasks in the study.
The lack of control of verbal intelligence in all three groups of participants is another
important limitation of the study. Because of the increased fatigue of patients suffering from
depression, we decided not to include another tool, e.g. theWAIS-R(PL) vocabulary subscale
(Polish adaptation of the Wechsler scale, Brzezin´ski et al. 1996), to measure verbal intelli-
gence. Instead, all three groups were balanced for education. We assumed that education is
highly correlated with vocabulary and, generally, greater cognitive reserve, due to usually
better synaptic connections and more effective use of alternative cognitive strategies in edu-
cated individuals (cf. remarks in Kahlaoui et al. 2012, a study on verbal fluency). However,
in doing so, we cannot clearly determine if any obtained differences are due to verbal intel-
ligence or not. A similar problem arises with the lack of normalized indicators of general
cognitive functioning (e.g., performance in the Mini-Mental State Examination, MMSE or
Montreal Cognitive Assessment, MoCA). Instead, in our project on understanding notions in
depression, the number of replies not given by a subject in the association task was taken as a
simple measure of cognitive function disorder. This was also caused by the specificity of the
depressive group under study. Our goal was to make the methods maximally easy and quick
to use, but the consequences include limitations in the generalization of the study results.
Another major limitation in generalizing the results is the specificity of the group of
patients in remission from depression (R). During study participant selection, the criteria for
a subject to belong to this group included (a) having had a depressive episode in the past
and (b) current remission of depression (i.e., having no symptoms of depression in the BDI)
during the study. This condition made it rather difficult to find participants for group R. Most
of the patients seeing doctors for checkups, diagnosed with “recurring depressive disorders,
currently in remission” achieved results in the Beck Depression Inventory that indicated
a depressive state. Over several months of the study, working with four psychiatrists, we
managed to find 12 subjects meeting the above criteria. This still leaves unanswered the
question of how representative the sample was, and whether the members of group R were
123
360 J Psycholinguist Res (2017) 46:345–366
typical representatives of the group in remission from depression. The criteria of participants’
selection were stringent and this may have significantly influenced the results.
Testing partially-remitted individuals is an important goal for future research. On the
other hand, there is clearly a need to find a more precise definition of the remission of
depression in diagnostic standards. Do we define remission as the complete disappearance
of symptoms, or a significant subsiding of their intensity that is perceptible to the patient?
Although there are proposals in the literature of what remitted means (e.g., Frank et al. 1991,
suggest diagnosing remission if a patient scores less than 7 in the Hamilton Rating Scale for
Depression (Hamilton 1980) and manifests no depressive symptom severe enough to impair
function within 3 months), many authors stress that remission is still variously defined (e.g.,
Manber et al. 2008). Resolving these factors may prove to be the key to interpreting the
contradictory results of research on the lasting nature of cognitive changes during remission
from depression.
The results discussed here could provide inspiration for expanding the cognitive theories
of depression originating from the ideas of Beck (1963, 1967). First of all, they prove there
is a need for cognitive models of depression to include a conceptual level of disorders (i.e.,
one associated with understanding notions). To our knowledge, the problem of conceptual
process disorders in depression is seldom included in contemporary research projects (for
more details, see Bartczak 2009; Bartczak and Bokus 2013, 2015). The issue is also ignored
by theoretical concepts explaining the etiology of depression, e.g., the best known cogni-
tive theory of depression—Beck’s theory of negative cognitive patterns—focuses mainly
on disturbances at the mental process level, not at the conceptual level. Listed examples
of cognitive distortions include excessive generalization and dichotomous thinking, and not
disturbed cognitive representations of PAST or HAPPINESS.
Researchers seem to have shown the greatest interest in the perception of temporal notions
and the way depressed subjects sense time. However, in contemporary research it is hard to
find projects dealing strictly with the way depressed people understand different concepts.
There have been some studies comparing perception of the passage of time in patients with
depression and healthy subjects (cf. the time reproduction task in Mahlberg et al. 2008; see
also studies by Gil and Droit-Volet 2009, and by Sévigny et al. 2003). However, these studies
do not touch upon depressive subjects’ comprehension of notions related to time, but only
the perception of time itself.
Our studies are a modest contribution on how patients with depression, and those in
remission from depression, understand notions. This research problem has yet to be fully
explained and should be addressed by future interdisciplinary studies. Considering the results
we have obtained, tools requiring the creation of semantic associative relations seem themost
promising, because it was only at this stage of conceptual processing that we managed to
identify differences between the performance of those in remission from depression and
non-depressed individuals. The question remains as to why processing of only some of the
notions brought significant inter-group differences. Perhaps this is related to the semantics
of the stimuli as a factor with a significant impact on directing the attention and on the
course of cognitive processes in depressed patients (cf. the content-specificity hypothesis;
Beck 1976). The problem of how depressed subjects, and those in remission from depression,
process notions still requires much research before it becomes possible to formulate any firm
conclusions regarding the distortion of conceptual processing caused by depression.
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Appendix: The Semantic Distance Task
Imagine that you have been invited to a party. When you arrive, you discover that the guests
include five people with the following nicknames: Past, Future, Joy, Sadness, Happiness.
1. What do you imagine these guests are like? Please characterize these people briefly by
writing their relevant qualities:
Past   ....................................................................................................................... 
                    ....................................................................................................................... 
Future   .......................................................................................................................  
                    .......................................................................................................................  
Joy   ............................................................................................................................ 
............................................................................................................................ 
Sadness   .................................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................ 
Happiness   ................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................ 
2. What other two people would you like to take to the party with you?
Person 1: ………………………………………………………………………………. 
Person 2: ………………………………………………………………………………. 
3. Please characterize these people briefly:








4. Where at the table would you sit at the party?Where would you like the other five people
to sit, and the two people that you think are missing from the guest list? Please label the
seats around the table accordingly.
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